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SUMMARY
This paper demonstrates the identiﬁcation of causal mechanisms of a binary treatment under selection on
observables, (primarily) based on inverse probability weighting; i.e. we consider the average indirect effect of
the treatment, which operates through an intermediate variable (or mediator) that is situated on the causal path
between the treatment and the outcome, as well as the (unmediated) direct effect. Even under random treatment
assignment, subsequent selection into the mediator is generally non-random such that causal mechanisms are only
identiﬁed when controlling for confounders of the mediator and the outcome. To tackle this issue, units are
weighted by the inverse of their conditional treatment propensity given the mediator and observed confounders.
We show that the form and applicability of weighting depend on whether some confounders are themselves
inﬂuenced by the treatment or not. A simulation study gives the intuition for these results and an empirical
application to the direct and indirect health effects (through employment) of the US Job Corps program is also
provided. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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1. INTRODUCTION
A vast literature in economics and other social sciences is concerned with the evaluation of average
treatment effects (ATE), both in randomized experiments and in observational studies. In many
evaluations not only is the (total) ATE of interest, but also the causal mechanisms through which it
operates. In this case, one would like to disentangle the direct effect of the treatment on the outcome
as well as the indirect ones that run through one or more intermediate variables—so-called mediators.
For example, when assessing the employment or earnings effects of an active labor market policy,
policymakers might want to know to what extent the total impact comes from increased search effort,
human capital or othermediators that are themselves affected by the policy. However, even in
experiments, causal mechanisms are not easily identiﬁed. As discussed in Robins and Greenland
(1992), random treatment assignment does not imply randomness of the mediator, which may be regarded
as an intermediate outcome. Therefore, the total effect cannot be disentangled by simply conditioning on a
mediator, because this generally introduces selection bias coming from variables inﬂuencing both the
mediator and the outcome (see Rosenbaum, 1984).1
The main contribution of this paper is to show that an easily implemented version of inverse
probability weighting (IPW)2 identiﬁes causal mechanisms under discrete or continuous mediators,
* Correspondence to: Martin Huber, University of St Gallen, Varnbüelstrasse 14, CH-9000 St Gallen, Switzerland.
E-mail: martin.huber@unisg.ch
1 For this reason, the early work on mediation analysis of Judd and Kenny (1981) highlights the importance of controlling for
such confounders. It therefore seems surprising that this issue has been ignored in so many applications in social sciences that
claim to identify direct and indirect effects.
2 The idea of IPW goes back to Horvitz and Thompson (1952), who ﬁrst proposed an estimator of the population mean in the
presence of non-randomly missing data.
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given that a sequential selection on observables (or conditional independence) assumption holds. The
latter requires (i) that the treatment is either random or exogenous given the covariates and (ii) that the
mediator is exogenous given the covariates and the treatment (see, for instance, Imai et al., 2010).
Direct and indirect effects can then be identiﬁed by weighting observations by their inverse conditional
propensities to be in a particular treatment state, given (i) the observed covariates and (ii) the mediator
and the observed covariates. Furthermore, we also report that the identiﬁcation results for the indirect
effects change if some of the covariates are themselves a function of the treatment. If the latter is the
case, the identiﬁcation of the ‘total’ indirect effect, which also accounts for correlations between those
covariates affected by the treatment and the mediator, requires additional restrictions (see Robins,
2003; Avin et al., 2005; and Imai and Yamamoto, 2013). In contrast, the ‘partial’ indirect effect, which
only considers the immediate link between the treatment and the mediator (and no ‘detour’ via any
covariates), is identiﬁed under weaker assumptions. We provide a simulation study that gives the
intuition for these identiﬁcation issues and apply our methods to experimental data on Job Corps, a
US educational program for disadvantaged youths.
The evaluation of direct and indirect effects, often referred to as mediation analysis, is widespread in
social sciences such as epidemiology, political sciences and psychology (see MacKinnon, 2008).
While many studies follow Baron and Kenny (1986) and rely on linear mediation models, more general
identiﬁcation under conditional exogeneity of the treatment and the mediator has been considered by
Pearl (2001), Robins (2003), Petersen et al. (2006), VanderWeele (2009), Imai et al. (2010), Albert
and Nelson (2011) and Imai and Yamamoto (2013), among others. One of the rare studies in econom-
ics is Flores and Flores-Lagunes (2009), who evaluate the direct earnings effect of Job Corps when
controlling for the mediator ‘work experience’. The issue is that participating in training likely
decreases work experience shortly after program start compared to non-participation due to decreased
job search effort during training participation (‘locking-in effect’). Assuming mediator exogeneity
conditional on pre-treatment covariates, Flores and Flores-Lagunes (2009) estimate a positive direct
effect on earnings based on a regression approach.3
If conditional exogeneity does not hold (and plausible instruments are not available), point
identiﬁcation is lost, but partial identiﬁcation based on deriving upper and lower bounds on the direct
and indirect effects might still be useful. For example, Kaufman et al. (2005), Cai et al. (2008) and
Sjölander (2009) focus on partial identiﬁcation in randomized medical trials with binary treatments
and impose speciﬁc restrictions such as monotonicity of the mediator in thetreatment in order to tighten
the bounds. In economics, Flores and Flores-Lagunes (2010) consider additional assumptions (e.g. a
particular order of the mean potential outcomes of various subpopulations) and assess the effectiveness
of various components of the Job Corps program.
This paper focusses on point identiﬁcation and makes four contributions to the literature on causal
mechanisms in economics. Firstly, it derives identiﬁcation results based on IPW by the treatment
propensity score that are straightforward to implement by semi- or nonparametric estimation. If the
mediator is exogenous conditional on pre-treatment covariates, our approach allows relaxing one
functional form assumption imposed in Flores and Flores-Lagunes (2009) (their Assumption 3). It is
also easier to implement than the nonparametric estimators of Imai et al. (2010), which require
estimating the conditional mean of the outcome and the conditional density of the mediator. Secondly,
and in contrast to Flores and Flores-Lagunes (2009), we also discuss identiﬁcation when mediator
exogeneity only holds conditional on post-treatment covariates which are themselves a function of
the treatment, such that pre-treatment variables do not fully capture mediator selection. This appears
realistic in most applications, including Job Corps, where the treatment likely affects variables that
3 As a further example, Simonsen and Skipper (2006) use a semiparametric identiﬁcation strategy based on matching to assess
the direct wage effect of motherhood in Denmark by controlling for several mediators through which motherhood may have an
inﬂuence on wages. They ﬁnd negative direct effects which vary little across different sectors.
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potentially confound the mediator and the outcome, e.g. intermediate health shortly prior to the
mediator. While direct effects are still identiﬁed by IPW in this set-up after a modiﬁcation of the
initial assumptions, the identiﬁcation of indirect effects requires additional restrictions. We
present a functional form restriction allowing us to do so, which, however, is less general than
the entirely nonparametric identiﬁcation under IPW. Thirdly, we show that IPW still identiﬁes a
partial indirect effect when keeping the confounders ﬁxed, i.e. the part of the indirect effect not
working through post-treatment confounders. Fourthly, as an empirical contribution, the present
work appears to be the ﬁrst which assesses the direct and indirect health effects of the Job
Corps program.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 deﬁnes the parameters of interest
(the average direct and indirect effects) and shows identiﬁcation (mostly) based on IPW. Section 3
brieﬂy discusses estimation. Section 4 presents a simulation study which provides the intuition for
various identiﬁcation issues. In Section 5, we apply our methods to the experimental study of the
Job Corps program. Section 6 concludes.
2. PARAMETERS OF INTEREST AND IDENTIFICATION
2.1. Deﬁnition of Parameters
Suppose we are interested in the average treatment effect (ATE) of a binary treatment indicator D on
some outcome variable Y. Furthermore, assume that we would like to disentangle the ATE into a
direct component and an indirect effect operating through the mediator M which has bounded
support and may be discrete or continuous. To deﬁne the parameters of interest, we use the potential
outcome framework advocated by Rubin (1974) (among many others) and considered in the direct
and indirect effects framework, for instance, by Rubin (2004), Ten Have et al. (2007) and Albert
(2008). Let Y(d),M(d) denote the potential outcome and the potential mediator state under treatment
d ın {0,1}. For each unit only one of the two potential outcomes and mediator states, respectively,
is observed, because the realized outcome and mediator values are Y =D  Y(1) + (1D)  Y(0) and
M =D M(1) + (1D) M(0).
The ATE is deﬁned by Δ=E[Y(1) Y(0)]. To disentangle this total effect into a direct and indirect
(through M) causal channel, ﬁrst note that the potential outcome can be rewritten as a function of both
the treatment and the intermediate variableM: Y(d) =Y(d,M(d)). It follows that the (average) direct effect
is identiﬁed by
y dð Þ ¼ E Y 1;M dð Þð Þ  Y 0;M dð Þð Þ½ ; d 2 0; 1f g (1)
i.e. by exogenously varying the treatment but keeping the mediator ﬁxed at its potential value for D= d.
Equivalently, the (average) indirect effects is deﬁned as
d dð Þ ¼ E Y d;M 1ð Þð Þ  Y d;M 0ð Þð Þ½ ; d 2 0; 1f g (2)
i.e. by exogenously shifting the mediator to its potential values under treatment and non-treatment but
keeping the treatment ﬁxed at D= d.4 Note that the ATE is the sum of the direct and indirect effects
deﬁned upon opposite treatment states:
4 Pearl (2001) named these parameters the natural direct and indirect effects, whereas Robins (2003) referred to them as the pure
direct and indirect effects and Flores and Flores-Lagunes (2009) as net and mechanism average treatment effects, respectively.
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Δ ¼ E½Yð1;M 1ð ÞÞ  Yð0;Mð0ÞÞ
¼ E½Yð1;M 1ð ÞÞ  Yð0;Mð1ÞÞ þ E½Yð0;Mð1ÞÞ  Yð0;Mð0ÞÞ ¼ yð1Þ þ dð0Þ
¼ E½Yð1;M 0ð ÞÞ  Yð0;Mð0ÞÞ þ E½Yð1;Mð1ÞÞ  Yð1;Mð0ÞÞ ¼ yð0Þ þ dð1Þ
(3)
which follows from adding and subtracting E[Y(0,M(1))] after the second and E[Y(1,M(0))] after the
fourth equality. The notation y(1),y(0) and d(1), d(0) highlights the possibility of effect heterogeneity
w.r.t. the treatment state, i.e. the presence of interaction effects between the treatment and the mediator.
However, it is obvious that these effects cannot be identiﬁed without further assumptions, as either
Y(1,M(1)) or Y(0,M(0)) is observed for any unit, whereas Y(1,M(0)) and Y(0,M(1)) are never observed.
Therefore, identiﬁcation of direct and indirect effects hinges on the existence of exogenous variation in
the treatment and the mediator.
2.2. Identiﬁcation Given Observed Confounders not Affected by the Treatment
We now introduce our identifying assumptions, maintaining an i.i.d. framework throughout the paper.
We start with the framework of conditional mediator exogeneity given the treatment and observed
covariates (denoted by X) which are themselves not a function of D, with the leading case being
pre-treatment covariates (evaluated prior to treatment assignment). Figure 1 provides a graphical
illustration using a directed acyclic graph, where each arrow represents a causal path. Below, we will
consider another set of restrictions assuming conditional mediator exogeneity given the treatment and
covariates that are (at least partially) themselves a function of D, and thus post-treatment variables,
which makes identiﬁcation more difﬁcult.
Our ﬁrst assumption requires the treatment to be conditionally independent (given X) of any
potential post-treatment variable, i.e. the potential mediator states and the potential outcomes. This is
referred to as conditional independence, selection on observables, or exogeneity in the treatment
evaluation literature (see, for instance, Imbens, 2004).
Assumption 1. (Conditional independence of the treatment)
{Y(d ’,m),M(d)}⊥D|X for all d ’, d2 {0,1} and m in the support of M.
Assumption 1 implies that there are no unobserved confounders jointly affecting the treatment on the
one hand and the mediator and/or the outcome on the other hand, conditional on the covariates X. In
observational studies the plausibility of this assumption, which has been criticized, among others, by
Heckman and Navarro-Lozano (2004), critically hinges on the richness of the data. In experiments, it is
satisﬁed if the treatment is either randomized within strata deﬁned on X or randomized unconditionally,
i.e. independent of X. (In the latter case, even the stronger condition {Y(d 0,m),M(d),X}⊥D holds.)
The second assumption imposes conditional independence of the mediator given the treatment and
the covariates along with a common support restriction on the conditional treatment probability.
Figure 1. Causal paths under conditional exogeneity of the mediator
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Assumption 2. (Conditional independence of the mediator)
a. Y(d 0,m)⊥M|D = d,X= x for all d 0, d2 {0,1} and m, x in the support of M,X;
b. Pr(D= d|M =m,X= x)> 0 for all d2 {0,1} and m, x in the support of M,X.
Assumption 2 (a) states that, conditional on D and X, the effect of the mediator on the outcome is
unconfounded. This implies that there exist no unobserved confounders jointly causing the mediator
and the outcome given the treatment and the covariates. Assumption 2(a) is, for instance, violated if
unobserved pre-treatment variables affect bothM and Y directly, i.e. not only through D and X. Neither
does it hold if unobserved post-treatment variables inﬂuenceM and Y and are not fully determined by X
and/or D. Therefore, 2(a) is a very strong restriction and only appears realistic if detailed information
on potential confounders of themediator is available in the data (even in experiments with random
treatment assignment where Assumption 1 is naturally satisﬁed). Furthermore, the described issue of
post-treatment confounding must be plausibly ruled out. Note that, alternatively to 2(a), identiﬁcation
might also be based on an instrument for the mediator as, for instance, discussed in Imai et al. (2011).
Assumption 2(b) is a common support restriction requiring that the conditional probability to be
treated given M,X, henceforth referred to as propensity score, is larger than zero in either treatment
state. It follows that Pr(D= d|X= x)> 0 must hold, too. Note that, by Bayes’ theorem, Assumption 2(b) also
implies that Pr(M=m|D= d,X= x)> 0 (or, in the case ofM being continuous, that the conditional density of
M givenD,X is larger than zero: fM|D,X(m,d,x)> 0). That is, conditional on X, the mediator state must not be
a deterministic function of the treatment, otherwise identiﬁcation is infeasible due to the lack of comparable
units in terms of the mediator across treatment states. Assumptions 1 and 2 correspond to the sequential
ignorability assumption of Imai et al. (2010) (their Assumption 1) and Tchetgen Tchetgen and Shpitser
(2011b), among others (see also the closely related Theorem 2 of Pearl, 2001). Also, Flores and Flores-
Lagunes (2009) use a similar set of restrictions in their Assumptions 2, 5 and 6, but in addition impose a
functional form assumption (their Assumption 3) which is not necessary for nonparametric identiﬁcation.
Assumptions 1 and 2 allow us to identify E[Y(d,M(d))] and E[Y(d,M(1 d))]. Starting with the
former, note that
E½Yðd;M dð ÞÞ ¼ E½E½Yðd;MðdÞÞjX ¼ x ¼ E½E½Y jD ¼ d;X ¼ x
¼ E E Y I D ¼ df g
Pr D ¼ djXð ÞjX ¼ x
  
¼ E Y I D ¼ df g
Pr D ¼ djXð Þ
 
(4)
where the ﬁrst equality follows from the law of iterated expectations, the second from Assumption 1,
the third from basic probability theory and the last from the law of iterated expectations (see also
Hirano et al., 2003). Concerning the latter:
E½Yðd;M 1 dð ÞÞ
¼ R R E½Y d;mð ÞjMð1 dÞ ¼ m;X ¼ xdFM 1dð ÞjX¼xðmÞdFXðxÞ
¼ R R E½Y d;mð ÞjD ¼ d;M ¼ m;X ¼ xdFMjD¼1d;X¼xðmÞdFXðxÞ
¼ R R E Y jD ¼ d;M ¼ m;X ¼ x½ Pr D ¼ 1 djM;Xð Þ
Pr D ¼ 1 djXð Þ dFMjX¼x mð ÞdFX xð Þ
¼ E E E Y I D ¼ df g
Pr D ¼ djM;Xð ÞjM ¼ m;X ¼ x
 
Pr D ¼ 1 djM;Xð Þ
Pr D ¼ 1 djXð Þ jX ¼ x
  
¼ E Y I D ¼ df g
Pr D ¼ djM;Xð Þ
Pr D ¼ 1 djM;Xð Þ
Pr D ¼ 1 djXð Þ
 
(5)
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The ﬁrst equality follows from the law of iterated expectations and from replacing the outer expec-
tations by integrals, the second from Assumptions 1 and 2, the third from Bayes’ theorem, the fourth
from basic probability theory and from replacing the integrals by expectations and the last from the law
of iterated expectations. Therefore, y(d) and d(d) are identiﬁed by either subtracting equation (5) from
equation (4) or vice versa, depending on whether d is one or zero. It follows by simple algebra that the
direct and indirect effects are obtained from Propositions 1 and 2.5
Proposition 1. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the average direct effect is identiﬁed by
y dð Þ ¼ E Y D
Pr D ¼ 1jM;Xð Þ 
Y  1 Dð Þ
1 Pr D ¼ 1jM;Xð Þ
 
 Pr D ¼ djM;Xð Þ
Pr D ¼ djXð Þ
 
(6)
Proposition 1 implies that by propensity score-based weighting the distributions of bothM and X are
balanced between treatment and control groups such that the direct effect is identiﬁed. In particular, the
distribution of the mediator in both groups corresponds to that of M(d) in the total population.
Concerning the indirect effect, note that by equation (3) it corresponds to the difference between the
average and the direct effect deﬁned on the opposite treatment state: d(d) =Δ y(1 d). Proposition
2 provides the representation of the indirect effect based on IPW, which is numerically identical to
this difference.
Proposition 2. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the average indirect effect is identiﬁed by
d dð Þ ¼ E Y I D ¼ df g
Pr D ¼ djM;Xð Þ 
Pr D ¼ 1jM;Xð Þ
Pr D ¼ 1jXð Þ 
1 Pr D ¼ 1jM;Xð Þ
1 Pr D ¼ 1jXð Þ
  
(7)
From a practitioner’s perspective, a nice feature of these identiﬁcation results is that they are
straightforward to implement. They only involve the (possibly parametric or nonparametric) estimation
of two binary choice models for the propensity scores which are then plugged into the (normalized)
sample analogs of Propositions 1 and 2, as outlined in Section 3. No parametric restrictions are
imposed on the models of the outcome and the mediator such that arbitrary nonlinearities are allowed
for. In contrast, the standard approach in the literature consists in estimating the ingredients of the
following alternative representations of the parameters of interest; see, for instance, equations (8)
and (26) in Pearl (2001) and Theorem 1 in Imai et al. (2010):
5 Propositions 1 and 2 can also be derived by starting from the mediation formulae (see Pearl, 2001) provided in equation (8),
which identify the direct and indirect effects under Assumptions 1 and 2. For example, considering the direct effect, note that
y dð Þ ¼ R R E YjD ¼ 1;M ¼ m;X ¼ x½   E YjD ¼ 0;M ¼ m;X ¼ x½ f gdFMjD¼d;X¼xðmÞdFXðxÞ
¼ R R E Y jD ¼ 1;M ¼ m;X ¼ x½   E YjD ¼ 0;M ¼ m;X ¼ x½ f gPr D ¼ djM;Xð Þ
Pr D ¼ djXð Þ dFMjX¼x mð ÞdFX xð Þ
¼ E E E YD
Pr D ¼ 1jM;Xð Þ 
Y 1Dð Þ
1 Pr D ¼ 1jM;Xð Þ
 
Pr D ¼ djM;Xð Þ
Pr D ¼ djXð Þ jX ¼ x
  
¼ E Y D
Pr D ¼ 1jM;Xð Þ 
Y  1 Dð Þ
1 Pr D ¼ 1jM;Xð Þ
 
Pr D ¼ djM;Xð Þ
Pr D ¼ djXð Þ
 
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y dð Þ ¼
ZZ
E Y jD ¼ 1;M ¼ m;X ¼ x½   E Y jD ¼ 0;M ¼ m;X ¼ x½ f gdFMjD¼d;X¼x mð ÞdFX xð Þ (8)
d dð Þ ¼
ZZ
E Y jD ¼ d;M ¼ m;X ¼ x½  dFMjD¼1;X¼x mð Þ  dFMjD¼0;X¼x mð Þ
 
dFX xð Þ (9)
This requires estimators for the conditional mean of Y given D,M,X and the conditional density ofM
given D,X. In the literature, parametric methods have been most commonly used (see, for instance,
Pearl, 2011; VanderWeele, 2009).6 They, however, appear unattractive due to their severe functional
form restrictions and the potentially difﬁcult interpretability of direct and indirect effects under
nonlinear modeling (e.g. when both the outcome and the mediator are binary). Nonparametric estima-
tion, as recently proposed in Imai et al. (2010), avoids these shortcomings but might be cumbersome in
empirical applications if X is high-dimensional and/orM is continuous. In contrast, estimation based on
Propositions 1 and 2 is less prone to such issues as it just relies on two propensity score models. Our
IPW-based results are also more general than the regression approach of Flores and Flores-Lagunes
(2009). The latter does not require the estimation of the conditional density of the mediator, but
imposes a functional form restriction (their Assumption 3) on the expected potential outcomes across
potential mediator states (for the treatment ﬁxed) which we need not invoke here.7
However, it is important to note that IPW also has its drawbacks: if the common support Assumption
2(b) is close to being violated, estimation may be unstable and the variance may explode (see Frölich
(2004) and Khan and Tamer (2010), among others). Furthermore, IPW is less robust to propensity
score misspeciﬁcation than other classes of estimators, as documented, for instance, in Kang and
Schafer (2007) and Waernbaum (2012). Therefore, matching on the propensity score (see, for instance,
Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983), which remains consistent under particular forms of propensity score
misspeciﬁcation, might represent a viable alternative to IPW.
2.3.. Identiﬁcation Given Observed Confounders Affected by the Treatment
It appears unlikely in many applications that conditioning on pre-treatment covariates is sufﬁcient to
control for mediator endogeneity, given that the mediator is itself a post-treatment variable. Equivalent
to the treatment evaluation literature, where potential confounders of the treatment are measured at or
shortly before the treatment, potential confounders of the mediator should be controlled for just before
the selection into the mediator takes place. Then, however, it appears likely that at least some of these
covariates are a function of the treatment, too, implying that they are themselves mediators that affect
the mediator of interest. Therefore, Robins (2003) suspects that the set-up relying on Assumptions 1
and 2 is of limited practical relevance. This most likely also applies to our application presented in
Section 5, where we are interested in the effect of the Job Corps program on health. The mediator is
employment and, clearly, some potential confounders affecting both employability and health (such
as the labor market state shortly prior to employment) are most likely a function of the treatment.
As in Robins (2003) and Imai and Yamamoto (2013), we therefore also consider a framework in
which D is permitted to have an effect on post-treatment confounders of the mediator, which we denote
by W. In this case, mediation analysis becomes more complicated and requires us to introduce
additional notation by rewriting the potential mediator and potential outcome also as functions of
6 Furthermore, Tchetgen Tchetgen and Shpitser (2011a) and Zheng and van der Laan (2012), among others, provide multiply
robust parametric estimators based on conditional mean estimation of the outcome and conditional density estimation of both
the treatment and the mediator.
7 Only if the mediator is exogenous conditional on post-treatment confounders which are themselves inﬂuenced by the treatment,
do we have to rely on a similar assumption, as outlined below.
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W: M(d) =M(d,W(d)) and Y(d,M(d)) = Y(d,M(d,W(d)),W(d)), where W(d) is the vector of potential
values of W for D = d. Then, the total indirect effect is deﬁned as
dt dð Þ ¼ E Y d;M 1;W 1ð Þð Þ;W dð Þð Þ  Y d;M 0;W 0ð Þð Þ;W dð Þð Þ½  (10)
We refer to dt(d) as the total indirect effect because it comprises all effects via M which either come
from D directly or ‘take a devious route’ through W. That is, this parameter accounts for the fact that
M is affected by D both directly and indirectly through a change in W. In contrast, the partial indirect
effect only identiﬁes the effect through M directly coming from D, but not going through W:
dp dð Þ ¼ E Y d;M 1;W dð Þð Þ;W dð Þð Þ  Y d;M 0;W dð Þð Þ;W dð Þð Þ½  (11)
That is, dp(d) is the ceteris paribus indirect effect via the mediator when holding W constant at the
level implied by d such that any channel through the post-treatment covariates is shut down. This is
what regressing Y on (1,D,M,W) and multiplying the coefﬁcient on M with the ﬁrst stage effect of D
on M obtains as ‘indirect effect’ in the limit, given that no further confounders are present. Obviously,
this effect neglects any correlations between M and W. We therefore argue that the total indirect effect
is the more interesting parameter,8 but nevertheless discuss the identiﬁcation of both parameters. How-
ever, it will be shown further below that dp(d) is more easily identiﬁed than dt(d). As a further remark,
note that dt(d) corresponds to d(d) (which also refers to the total of indirect effects) in Section 2.2,
where we, however, did not distinguish between total and partial effects due to the absence of post-
treatment confounders.
The direct effect is deﬁned as
y dð Þ ¼ E Y 1;M d;W dð Þð Þ;W dð Þð Þ  Y 0;M d;W dð Þð Þ;W dð Þð Þ½  (12)
i.e. it corresponds to the change in the mean potential outcome due to an exogenous change in the treat-
ment, while keeping the mediator and the post-treatment covariates ﬁxed. Note that this deﬁnition differs
from Imai and Yamamoto (2013), who consider the difference between the ATE and the total indirect
effect to be the ‘direct’ effect: E[Y(d,M(d,W(d)),W(d)) Y(1 d,M(d,W(d)),W(1 d))]. However, this
includes changes in the mean potential outcome which are due to a change inW which is not mediated by
M. Here, we deﬁne the direct effect in a narrower sense that also excludes (inherently indirect)
channels viaW. For this reason, y(d) and dt(d) or dp(d), respectively, do not add up to the ATE, as either
E[Y(d,M(d,W(1)),W(1))Y(d,M(d,W(0)),W(0))] or E[Y(d,M(d,W(d)),W(1)) Y(d,M(d,W(d)),W(0))]
are not accounted for, respectively.
The directed acyclic graph in Figure 2 displays a set-up where the treatment affects the observed
confounders W of the mediator. Because we need to condition on W, identiﬁcation requires ruling
out unobserved confounders that jointly cause W on the one hand and M and/or Y on the other hand.
Furthermore, just as in Section 2.2, we also have to control for pre-treatment covariates that jointly
affect the treatment and the mediator/outcome. A further identiﬁcation issue arises if all or some pre-
treatment covariates also have an impact on the post-treatment covariates W. Then, conditioning on
the latter changes the distribution of pre-treatment covariates even if they were initially balanced across
treatment states as in randomized experiments. For this reason, we, in addition to the confounders of
the treatment, also need to control for all those pre-treatment covariates that are jointly related to W
on the one hand and directly to the outcome and/or the mediator on the other. Otherwise, conditioning
on W would introduce a correlation between D and those pre-treatment covariates predicting both W
and M or Y and, thus, treatment endogeneity. We denote by X the vector of all pre-treatment covariates
8 Also, Imai and Yamamoto (2013) focus on dt(d) as indirect effect and do not consider dp(d) at all.
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that may cause one or several of the forms of confounding just discussed and replace Assumptions 1
and 2 by Assumptions 3 and 4 to incorporate post-treatment confounders of the mediator.
Assumption 3. (Conditional independence of the treatment)
a. {Y(d00,m,w0),M(d0,w),W(d)}⊥D|X= x for all d00, d0, d2 {0,1} and m,w0,w, x in the support of
M,W,X;
b. {Y(d00,m,w00),M(d0,w0)}⊥D|W =w,X= x for all d0, d2 {0,1} and m,w00,w0,w, x in the support of
M,W,X.
Similar to Assumption 1, Assumption 3(a) says thatD is conditionally independent of any potential post-
treatment variables, namely the potential outcomes, the potential mediator states and the potential values of
the post-treatment confounders of the mediator. Assumption 3(b) is new and states that the conditional inde-
pendence of the treatment and the potential outcomes or mediator states must also hold when jointly condi-
tioning onW and X, implying that all pre-treatment covariates affecting bothW andM or Y are included in X.
Assumption 4. (Conditional independence of the mediator)
a. Y(d00,m,w0)⊥M|D= d,W=w,X = x for all d00, d0, d2 {0,1} and m,w0,w, x in the support of M,W,X;
b. Pr(D = d|M=m,W =w,X= x)> 0 for all d2 {0,1} and m,w, x in the support of M,W,X.
Assumption 4(a) is related to, but somewhat weaker than Assumption 2(a), as conditional
independence is now only required to hold given pre- and post-treatment covariates. This, for
instance, rules out that unobserved pre-treatment variables affect both M and Y directly, i.e. not only
through D, X and/or W. Furthermore, it requires that any unobserved post-treatment variables which
are not a deterministic function of D and/or X must not jointly cause M and Y conditional on W.
Assumption 4(b) says that the common support restriction on the treatment propensity must hold when
conditioning on M and both W and X.
When comparing our assumptions to others made in the literature, it turns out that Assumptions 3
and 4(a) are similar to FRCISTG (fully randomized causally interpretable structural tree graph) in
Robins (2003) (see also Robins, 1986) and Assumption 2 in Imai and Yamamoto (2013), with one
important difference: Robins (2003) and Imai and Yamamoto (2013) merely assume that Y(d,m,W(d))
and M(d) deﬁned on the same treatment are conditionally independent. In contrast, Assumption 4(a)
imposes conditional independence of Y(d00,m,W(d0)) and M(d) for possibly distinct d00, d0, d
(i.e. also for potential outcomes and potential mediator states deﬁned on opposite treatments).9 This
9 Robins and Richardson (2010) present a DGP in their Appendix B, where indeed FRCISTG holds, while our stronger restric-
tion is not satisﬁed. However, Robins (2003) argues that it seems hard to construct realistic scenarios where one set of assump-
tions holds while the other one does not.
Figure 2. Causal paths with pre-treatment covariates (X) and post-treatment covariates (W)
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stronger conditional independence allows for nonparametric identiﬁcation of the direct and partial
indirect effects without further restrictions (other than Assumptions 3 and 4), but not of the total
indirect effect, as discussed below. In contrast, FRCISTG does not identify any of the parameters
without further functional form restrictions (as imposed in Robins, 2003, and Imai and
Yamamoto, 2013).
Propositions 3 and 4 concern the identiﬁcation of the direct effect, which hinges on the identiﬁability
of E[Y(1 d,M(d,W(d)),W(d))], and of the partial indirect effect, respectively, which requires
E[Y(d,M(1 d,W(d)),W(d))]. The respective proofs, which are similar to equation (5), are provided in
Appendix A.2 (supporting information).
Proposition 3. Under Assumptions 3 and 4, the average direct effect is identiﬁed by
y dð Þ ¼ E Y D
Pr D ¼ 1jM;W ;Xð Þ 
Y  1 Dð Þ
1 Pr D ¼ 1jM;W;Xð Þ
 
 Pr D ¼ djM;W ;Xð Þ
Pr D ¼ djXð Þ
 
(13)
Proposition 4. Under Assumptions 3 and 4, the average partial indirect effect is identiﬁed by
dp dð Þ ¼ E Y I D ¼ df g
Pr D ¼ djM;W;Xð Þ 
Pr D ¼ djW ;Xð Þ
Pr D ¼ djXð Þ 
Pr D ¼ 1jM;W ;Xð Þ
Pr D ¼ 1jW ;Xð Þ 
1 Pr D ¼ 1jM;W ;Xð Þ
1 Pr D ¼ 1jW;Xð Þ
  
(14)
The identiﬁcation of the total indirect effect requires identifying E[Y(d,M(1 d,W(1 d)),W(d))].
Unfortunately, this is not feasible without further assumptions; see the proof in Avin et al. (2005)
and the results of Albert and Nelson (2011), who consider a sequential conditional independence
assumption that is similar to ours. The reason is that conditional on X (when the treatment is as good
as random), the identiﬁcation of E[Y(d,M(1 d,W(1 d)),W(d))] requires exogenously adjusting the
distribution of M given D= d to that of M given D= 1 d, while at the same time keeping the
distribution of W ﬁxed (given D= d). Obviously, this is impossible if W and M are not independent
conditional on X.
However, Robins (2003) shows under FRCISTG that the total indirect effect is identiﬁed under an
additional restriction, namely the absence of interaction effects between D and M. Formally, his
assumption implies that the unit-level treatment effect (for any unit i) for the mediator ﬁxed is constant
across different values of the mediator:
Yi 1;m;Xi 1ð Þð Þ  Yi 0;m;Xi 0ð Þð Þ ¼ Yi 1;m0;Xi 1ð Þð Þ  Yi 0;m0;Xi 0ð Þð Þ ¼ Bi
where Bi is a unit-level constant. Unfortunately, this assumption appears unattractive in empirical
applications (see, for instance, the discussion in Imai et al., 2012, Section 3.1) and restricts the
usefulness of nonparametric identiﬁcation advocated in recent work. However, Imai and Yamamoto
(2013) demonstrate that under FRCISTG the assumption of no interaction effect can be relaxed to
assuming a homogeneous interaction effect:
Yi 1;m;Xi 1ð Þð Þ  Yi 0;m;Xi 0ð Þð Þ ¼ Bi þ Cm
where C is constant for any m, i.e. the interaction between the treatment and the mediator varies
homogeneously for all observations.
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Here, we propose a functional form restriction on the relation of the mean potential outcome and the
mediator across treatment states that is comparable to Assumption 3 in Flores and Flores-Lagunes
(2009) (who, however, use it in the set-up where D does not affect W).
Assumption 5. (Functional form of mean potential outcome–mediator relation)
a. E[Y(d,m,w)|D= d,M(d,W(d)) =m,W(d) =w,X= x] =m(d,m,w,x) for all d2 {0,1} and m,w, x in the
support of M,W,X, with the function m(D,M,W,X) being linear in M;
b. E[Y(d,m,w)|D= d,M(d,W(d)) =m,W(d) =w,X= x] =E[Y(d,m,w)|D= d,M(1 d,W(1 d)) =m,W
(d) =w,X= x] for all d2 {0,1} and m,w, x in the support of M,W,X.
By Assumption 5(a) the conditional mean potential outcome underD= d can be characterized by the re-
gressionmodel m, which is restricted to be a linear function of the mediator. Assumption 5(b) states that one
can use this very same regression model to predict E[Y(d,m,x)|M(1 d,W(1 d)) =m,W(d) =w,X= x].
That is, the functional form of m(d,M(d,W(d)),W(d),X) is assumed to be identical to m(d,M(1 d,
W(1 d)),W(d),X) wheneverM(d,W(d)) =M(1 d,W(1 d)). This restriction implies that the mean
interaction effect of the treatment and the mediator is the same for any M(1,W(1)) =M(0,W(0)) =m
conditional on W(d) and X, otherwise the regression functions necessarily differ. Together with
Assumptions 3 and 4, Assumption 5 permits the identiﬁcation of E[Y(d,M(1 d,W(1 d)),W(d))],
even though M(1 d,W(1 d)) is not known for units with D = d. The trick is to use E[M(1 d,W
(1 d))], which can be identiﬁed in the population with D = 1 d, in our regression model: m(d, E
[M(1 d,W(1 d))],W(d), x). By the linearity assumption 5(b) and the law of iterated expectations
it follows that E[m(d, E[M(1 d,W(1 d))],w, x)|D = d] = E[m(d,M(1 d,W(1 d)),w, x)|D = d],
which allows identifying E[Y(d,M(1 d,W(1 d)),W(d))]. However, it has to be stressed that
Assumption 5 is far from being innocuous. Firstly, it requires a correctly speciﬁed regression model
that allows making predictions across mediator states. Secondly, the linearity assumption rules out
more general relations between the outcome and the mediator.
Given that these considerably stronger functional form assumptions are satisﬁed,E[Y(d,M(1 d,W(1 d)),
W(d))], which is required for identifying the total indirect effect, is obtained from the following result:
E½Yðd;Mð1 d;W 1 dð ÞÞ;WðdÞÞ
¼ R E½E½Yðd;Mð1 d;W 1 dð ÞÞ;wÞjWðdÞ ¼ w;X ¼ xjX ¼ xdFXðxÞ
¼ R E½E½Yðd;Mð1 d;W 1 dð ÞÞ;wÞjD ¼ d;W ¼ w;X ¼ xjD ¼ d;X ¼ xdFXðxÞ
¼ R E½E½Yðd;E½Mð1 d;W 1 dð ÞÞ;wÞjD ¼ d;W ¼ w;X ¼ xjD ¼ d;X ¼ xdFXðxÞ
¼ R E½E½Yðd;E½Mð1 d;W 1 dð ÞÞ;wÞjD ¼ d;M ¼ E½Mð1 d;Wð1 dÞÞ;W
¼ w;X ¼ xjD ¼ d;X ¼ xdFXðxÞ
¼ R E m d;E M 1 d;W 1 dð Þð Þ½ ;W ; xð ÞjD ¼ d;X ¼ x½ dFX xð Þ
¼ R E
m d;E E MI D ¼ 1 df g
Pr D ¼ 1 djXð ÞjX ¼ x
  
;W ; x
 
I D ¼ df g
Pr D ¼ djXð Þ jX ¼ x
2
664
3
775dFX xð Þ
¼ E
m d;E MI D ¼ 1 df g
Pr D ¼ 1 djXð Þ
 
;W;X
 
I D ¼ df g
Pr D ¼ djXð Þ
2
664
3
775
(15)
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The ﬁrst equality follows from the law of iterated expectations and from replacing the outer
expectation by an integral, the second from Assumption 3, the third from Assumption 5, the fourth
from Assumption 4, the ﬁfth from Assumption 5, the sixth from Assumption 3 and from basic
probability theory, and the last from replacing the integral by an expectation and from the law of
iterated expectations.
Proposition 5. Under Assumptions 3, 4 and 5, the average total indirect effect is identiﬁed by
dt 1ð Þ ¼ E
Y  m 1;E M 1Dð Þ1Pr D¼1jXð Þ
h i
;W ;X
 	n o
D
Pr D ¼ 1jXð Þ
2
4
3
5;
dt 0ð Þ ¼ E
m 0;E MDPr D¼1jXð Þ
h i
;W ;X
 	
 Y
n o
 1 Dð Þ
1 Pr D ¼ 1jXð Þ
2
4
3
5
(16)
It is interesting to compare this result to Albert and Nelson (2011), who use a similarly strong
sequential ignorability assumption and assume parametric models for D, W, M and Y, which are
estimated by maximum likelihood methods. However, they do not identify E[Y(d,M(1 d,W(1 d)),
W(d))] and dt(d) without further assumptions, because the linearity restriction (5a) is not imposed
therein. Therefore, recovering the total indirect effect comes at thecost of ruling out models that are
nonlinear in the mediator, which are permitted in Albert and Nelson (2011).
3. ESTIMATION
For estimation in Sections 4 and 5, we use normalized versions of the sample analogs of the IPW-based
identiﬁcation results in Propositions 1–4, such that the weights of the observations in either treatment
state add up to unity, as advocated in Imbens (2004) and Busso et al. (2009b).10 For example, the
normalized estimators of the direct effects under treatment and non-treatment are given by
y^ 1ð Þ ¼
P
YiDi=p^ Xið ÞP
Di=p^ Xið Þ 
P
Yi 1 Dið Þp^ Mi;Xið Þ= 1 p^ Mi;Xið Þð Þp^ Xið Þ½ P
1 Dið Þp^ Mi;Xið Þ= 1 p^ Mi;Xið Þð Þp^ Xið Þ½  ;
y^ 0ð Þ ¼
P
YiDi 1 p^ Mi;Xið Þð Þ= p^ Mi;Xið Þ 1 p^ Xið Þð Þ½ P
Di 1 p^ Mi;Xið Þð Þ= p^ Mi;Xið Þ 1 p^ Xið Þð Þ½  
P
Yi 1 Dið Þ= 1 p^ Xið Þð ÞP
1 Dið Þ= 1 p^ Xið Þð Þ
where i is the index of the observations in the i.i.d. sample and p^ Mi;Xið Þ, p^ Xið Þ denote the respective
estimates of the propensity scores Pr(D= 1|Mi,Xi), Pr(D= 1|Xi), which we estimate by probit
speciﬁcations. Our semiparametric IPW estimators (into which the propensity scores enter
parametrically) can be expressed as sequential GMM estimators where propensity score estimation
represents the ﬁrst step and effect estimation the second step (see Newey, 1984). It follows from his
results that our methods are
ﬃﬃﬃ
n
p
-consistent under standard regularity conditions. Furthermore, IPW
estimators are sufﬁciently smooth for the bootstrap being consistent for inference. We therefore
estimate the standard errors in the application in Section 5 by 1999 bootstrap draws.
10 We do not use any propensity score trimming as considered in Busso et al. (2009a), Crump et al. (2009) and Huber et al.
(2013), because propensity scores close to the boundaries 0 and 1 occur neither in our simulation study in Section 4 nor in
our application in Section 5.
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Concerning the estimation of the total indirect effects based on Proposition 5, m is speciﬁed as a
linear function of the covariates and the mediator within each treatment state, such that two linear
models (for D = 1, 0) have to be estimated. That is, m d;M;X;Wð Þ ¼ bd0 þMbdM þ XbdX þWbdW, where
ad0; b
d
M ; b
d
X ; b
d
W represent the constant and the slope coefﬁcients on M,X,W for D = d. Note that
estimating two separate models for each treatment state allows for interactions of D and each of M,X,
W. For inference, we again use the bootstrap in the application.
4. SIMULATIONS
This section presents a simulation study that provides some intuition for the identiﬁcation results and
the issues related to imposing the wrong set of assumptions. For ease of exposition, we consider a data-
generating process (DGP) which is based on linear equations:
Y ¼ 0:5DþM þ bDM þ V þ 0:25U þ e1 (17)
M ¼ 0:5Dþ 0:5V þ 0:25U þ e2 (18)
V ¼ gDþ 0:25U þ e3 (19)
D ¼ I 0:25U þ e4 > 0f g;with U; e1; e2; e3; e4  N 0; 1ð Þ; independently of each other (20)
Equation (17) is the outcome equation, in which the observed Y is a function of the observed
variables D,M,V,U and an unobserved term e1. b gauges the interaction effect between D and M such
that b= 0 satisﬁes the assumption of no interaction discussed in Robins (2003). By equation (18), the
mediator is a function of D,V,U and the unobservable e2.
11 The parameter g in equation (19)
determines whether V is caused by D and which set of assumptions is valid. If g = 0, Assumptions 1
and 2 hold if X therein is deﬁned as {V,U}. Otherwise, identiﬁcation has to be based on Assumptions
3–5, with W therein corresponding to V and X corresponding to U. By equation (20), the
treatment is conditionally independent given U with an unconditional treatment probability of 0.5. In
the simulations, we set g to 0 and 0.2 and b to 0 and 0.5. Table I provides the true direct and indirect
effects for the various scenarios, which are explained in more detail in Appendix A.3
(supporting information).
We run 5000 Monte Carlo simulations with 2000 observations and estimate the models by the
normalized sample analogs of either Propositions 1 and 2 (for g = 0) or Propositions 3–5
(for g = 0.2), respectively. In addition, we also consider ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, which
estimates the direct effect as the coefﬁcient on D in a regression of Y on (1,D,M,V,U). The indirect
effect corresponds to the coefﬁcient on M in the latter regression multiplied by the coefﬁcient on D
in a regression of M on (1,D,V,U). This approach omits interactions between D and M so that direct
and indirect effects are implicitly assumed to be homogeneous w.r.t. the treatment.12 For this reason
we also estimate a linear model that includes the treatment mediator interaction as modeled in
equation (17) for b 6¼ 0. See, for instance, Imai et al. (2010) for a deﬁnition of the direct and indirect
effects in terms ofregression coefﬁcients in this somewhat more general framework. Finally, we also
include a naive OLS estimator where the D-M interaction and V,U are omitted so that the confounders
of the mediator/treatment are not controlled for.
11 Note that the potential mediator states are M(1) = 0.5 + 0.5V+ 0.25U+ e2 and M(0) = 0.5V+ 0.25U+ e2, the potential outcomes
are Y(1,M(d)) = 0.5 + (1 + b)M(d) +V+ 0.25U+ e1 and Y(0,M(d)) =M(d) +V+ 0.25U+ e1 for d 2 {1,0}.
12 This issue is often encountered in empirical work; see Section 4.1 of Imai et al. (2011) for a revision and discussion of the
shortcomings of the standard linear framework.
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Table II presents the bias, variance and mean squared error (MSE) of the various estimators for g = 0.
The IPW estimators based on Propositions 1 and 2 (y^IPW dð Þ, d^IPW dð Þ) are almost unbiased and their
MSEs are moderate in any scenario. The same applies to OLS regression, including the D–M
interaction term (y^OLS:ia dð Þ, d^OLS:ia dð Þ), which is somewhat more efﬁcient because it is fully parametric.
For b= 0, also the OLS estimators without interaction (y^OLS dð Þ, d^OLS dð Þ) perform decently. However,
they are biased if b= 0.5 due to omitting the interaction term. The naive estimators (y^naive dð Þ, d^naive dð Þ)
are biased in general, as they disregard confounding.
Table III provides the results for g =0.2. Concerning the direct effects, we observe a similar pattern in
terms of the relative performance across estimators as before. Taking a look at the total indirect effect
reveals that the estimator based on Proposition 4, d^
t
dð Þ, is almost unbiased. In contrast, when using IPW
based on Proposition 2 (d^IPW dð Þ) for estimating dt(d), the bias is non-negligible. Also, OLS both with
and without treatment-mediator interaction is generally biased under any b, because V is controlled for
in the regression as if it was not affected by D. However, for b =0, d^OLS dð Þ still consistently estimates
the partial indirect effect dp(d), i.e. the ceteris paribus impact going through M for V,U ﬁxed.
d^OLS:ia dð Þ does so even if b= 0.5, because it accounts for the interaction effect. Also d^pIPW dð Þ , the
IPW estimator of the indirect effect based on Proposition 3, performs well when estimating the partial
indirect effect, while d^IPW dð Þ is again biased. The bias of the naive estimator is large for both the partial
and total indirect effects.
In conclusion, the methods proposed in this paper perform well in the simulations if chosen
according to the appropriate identifying assumptions. However, so does y^OLS:ia dð Þ , d^OLS:ia dð Þ
for g = 0. Therefore, the question arises whether there exist scenarios in which IPW outperforms
a parametric estimator that is ﬂexible enough to allow for treatment–mediator interactions. This
may generally be the case if the parametric model is misspeciﬁed. To demonstrate this, we reconsider
the DGP with g = 0 and b= 0.5, but add the interaction DU to the right-hand side of equation (17) such
that y^OLS:ia dð Þ, d^OLS:ia dð Þ are based on a wrong outcome model. In a second set-up, we additionally
include the interaction DV. The results in Table IV show that IPW is still consistent, while the bias
of y^OLS:ia dð Þ, d^OLS:ia dð Þ increases as the misspeciﬁcation of the outcome becomes more severe. A more
comprehensive investigation of the ﬁnite sample performance of IPW relative to alternative estimators
is left to future research.
5. APPLICATION
We apply the estimators resulting from Propositions 1–5 to a welfare policy experiment with a binary
treatment assignment (D) which was conducted in the mid 1990s to assess the publicly funded US Job
Table I. True direct and indirect effects for various scenarios
Effect
g =0 g =0.2
b =0 b =0.5 b =0 b =0.5
d= 1 d= 0 d= 1 d= 0 d= 1 d= 0 d= 1 d= 0
y(d) 0.5 0.5 0.75 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.8 0.5
d(d) 0.5 0.5 0.75 0.5 — — — —
dt(d) — — — — 0.6 0.6 0.9 0.6
dp(d) — — — — 0.5 0.5 0.75 0.5
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Corps program.13 The program targets young individuals (aged 16–24 years) who legally reside in the
USA and come from a low-income household. It provides participants with approximately 1200 hours
of vocational training and education, housing and board over an average duration of 8 months.
Participants also receive health education as well as health and dental care. Schochet et al. (2001,
2008) discuss in detail the experimental design14 and the ATEs on a broad range of outcomes.
Their ﬁndings suggest that Job Corps increases educational attainment, reduces criminal activity,
and increases employment and earnings (at least for some years after the program).
Flores and Flores-Lagunes (2009) appear to be the ﬁrst to assess the causal mechanisms of the
program and ﬁnd a positive direct effect on earnings after controlling for the mediator work experience
which they assume to be conditionally exogenous given pre-treatment variables. Flores and Flores-
Lagunes (2010) bound the indirect effects of Job Corps on employment and earnings which are
mediated by the achievement of a GED, high school degree or vocational degree, as well as the direct
effects based on a partial identiﬁcation approach that allows for mediator endogeneity. In contrast to
these studies which are concerned with labor market outcomes, we focus on the program’s effects
on general health. To be precise, we consider a binary health indicator (Y) evaluated 2.5 years after
randomization, which is equal to one if self-assessed general health is stated to be very good and zero
otherwise. In this context, employment appears to be an interesting mediator, as it is affected by Job
Corps and may itself have an impact on health.
In line with this idea, Huber et al. (2011) ﬁnd that entering employment increases self-assessed
mental health when investigating a sample of German welfare recipients. Furthermore, several studies
in medicine and social sciences conclude that there is a negative association between unemployment
and health; see, for instance, the surveys by Jin et al. (1997), Björklund and Eriksson (1998) and
Mathers and Schoﬁeld (1998). We therefore disentangle the total health effect into a direct and an
indirect component that is due to a change in the likelihood to work. If there existed a positive total
effect which, however, only operated through employment, this could imply that health care and health
education were less decisive for general health than the human-capital related interventions of Job
Corps which affect employability. In this context, the analysis of causal mechanisms may help to
assess the usefulness of different components of a program in place.
We deﬁne employment in the ﬁrst half of the second year after randomization (i.e. half way between
the treatment assignment and the measurement of the outcome) as our mediator of interest (M). That is,
M = 1 in the case of any kind of employment and M = 0 otherwise. We argue that the covariates to be
controlled for should include potential confounders that are measured shortly before the mediator, as
they may change over time, in particular as a function of the treatment. In contrast to Flores and
Flores-Lagunes (2009), we therefore do not exclusively rely on pre-treatment covariates but also use
variables measured in the year after treatment assignment, just before the assessment of the mediator.
Nevertheless, we also condition on a rich set of pre-treatment variables, not only to control for mediator
endogeneity but also to avoid confounding of the treatment induced by conditioning on post-treatment
variables only.
The empirical literature (see, for instance, Mulatu and Schooler, 2002, and Llena-Nozal et al., 2004,
among many others) suggests that socio-economic factors such as education, age and income are
strongly correlated with health while they also determine an individual’s employment perspectives.
As discussed in Huber et al. (2011), similar arguments are likely to hold for the labor market history.
13 Note that compliance with the treatment assignment was not perfect. According to Schochet et al. (2008) only 73% of eligible
individuals actually enrolled at Job Corps centers. Here, we abstract from this issue and consider the assignment as treatment var-
iable. Strictly speaking, we therefore consider (direct and indirect) ‘intention to treat’ effects rather than treatment effects.
14 In particular, Schochet et al. (2001) report that the randomization of the program was successful: of 94 observed pre-treatment
covariates, only ﬁve where statistically signiﬁcantly different across treatment groups at the 5% level, which is what one would
expect by chance.
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For example, previous jobs might have a positive or negative effect on health depending on an
individual’s level of stress, willingness/reluctance to work or physical strain. Furthermore, as
acknowledged in Böckerman and Ilmakunnas (2009), it appears important to condition on initial
(in our case: pre-mediator) health, which allows controlling for time-constant unobservable
confounders. In the data, we do not only observe initial health but also health behavior prior to the
mediator period such as alcohol and drug abuse.
We analyze the direct and indirect effects of the program separately by gender, in order to
account for potential effect heterogeneity. We restrict the initial dataset (14,327 youths with
completed baseline survey prior to the treatment assignment) to the 4352 females and 5673 males
for which the post-treatment variables M and Y are observed in the follow-up survey after
2.5 years. Table V presents descriptive evidence that the selection into the mediator is indeed
non-random for females and males in our evaluation sample. Individuals entering employment
1–1.5 years after randomization are on average slightly older (in the case of females), more edu-
cated (in the case of males), less often arrested, more likely to be white, less likely to receive
public housing, transfer payments and food stamps, and living in smaller households at assign-
ment. The association with household income is non-monotonic, whereas the number of children
is (as expected) negatively associated with female employment and positively with male employ-
ment. Concerning the labor market history, we see a strong positive correlation between previous
employment and the mediator and a negative association of the latter with being in a training
activity in the year before the mediator assessment, pointing to locking-in effects. In contrast,
pre-mediator health is not strongly correlated with the mediator employment. Both the differences
in general health (evaluated on a scale) and the incidence of physical or emotional problems
(dummy variable) are insigniﬁcant. Maybe surprisingly, alcohol abuse is higher among the
working than among the non-working, while differences in illegal drug use are mostly
insigniﬁcant.
In the estimation of the direct effects as well as the total and partial indirect effects based on As-
sumptions 3–5, we control for both the pre-assignment and post-assignment (but pre-mediator) values
of these potential confounders in separate propensity score speciﬁcations (probit) for females and
males.15 We test the models of Pr(D= 1|M,W,X) by the nonparametric speciﬁcation test for propensity
score models proposed by Shaikh et al. (2009), which does not reject the speciﬁcations at any conven-
tional signiﬁcance level.16 Furthermore, we also estimate the indirect effects based on Assumptions 1
and 2, where we only condition on the pre-assignment covariates when estimating the propensity score
Pr(D= 1|M,X).
Table VI presents the estimated effects on females and males. The second column gives the ATE, i.e.
the mean difference between treated and non-treated outcomes, along with the standard error (SE) and
p-value. Taking a look at the females, the estimate suggests that Job Corps increases the incidence of a
very good general health state by 2.8% points.17 The direct effects under treatment (column 3) and
non-treatment (column 4) are almost identical to the ATE and signiﬁcant at the 10% level. Therefore,
the program appears to have a sizable effect that is not mediated by employment. In contrast, the total
and partial indirect effects based on Assumptions 1–3 (columns 5–8) as well as the indirect effects
15 The distributions of the propensity scores across treatment states and gender are provided in Appendix A.1 (supporting
information).
16 Shaikh et al. (2009) show that f Pr D¼1jM;W;Xð ÞjD¼1 rjD ¼ 1ð Þ ¼ Pr D¼0ð ÞPr D¼1ð Þ r1rf Pr D¼1jM;W;Xð ÞjD¼0 rjD ¼ 0ð Þfor allr 2 0; 1ð Þ, with fPr
(D = 1|M,W,X)|D= d(|D= d) being the probability density function of Pr(D= 1|M,W,X) conditional on D= d, is a testable implication
of a correctly speciﬁed propensity score. Using their test based on kernel density estimation, where the bandwidth is chosen
according to the Silverman (1986) rule of thumb, we obtain p-values of 0.657 and 0.431 for the propensity scores in the female
and male samples, respectively. The non-rejection of the models is insensitive to using twice or half the bandwidth.
17 The mean outcome is 0.343 among the treated and 0.315 among the non-treated such that the ATE amounts to roughly 8–9%
of the mean outcomes.
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based on Assumptions 1 and 2 (columns 9 and 10) are close to zero and insigniﬁcant. Therefore,
employment does not seem to mediate the effectiveness of the program in any important way. For
males, the ATE amounts to 2.2% points and is signiﬁcant at the 10% level.18 In contrast to the females,
however, we do not ﬁnd any sizable direct effects, which points to effect heterogeneity w.r.t. gender.
An interesting picture arises when looking at the indirect effects. While the total and partial indirect
effects based on Assumptions 3–5 are all close to zero, estimation based on Assumptions 1 and 2 leads
to partly conﬂicting results: d^ 1ð Þ is signiﬁcantly positive,19 which is at odds with d^t 1ð Þ , as both
18 The mean outcomes are 0.432 under treatment and 0.410 under non-treatment.
19 In contrast, the direct effects y^ 1ð Þ, y^ 0ð Þ remain virtually unchanged when conditioning on pre-treatment covariates only, both
for males and females.
Table V. Descriptives
Females Males
Variable M= 1 M= 0 Diff. p-val. M= 1 M= 0 Diff. p-val.
Socio-economic factors
Age at assignment 18.750 18.377 0.373 0.000 18.506 17.880 0.627 0.000
Years of education at ass. 10.523 10.047 0.476 0.000 10.242 10.116 0.126 0.397
In school in yr. before ass. 0.629 0.635 0.006 0.662 0.644 0.696 0.052 0.000
No. of own children in household
after 1st yr
0.496 0.671 0.175 0.000 0.129 0.092 0.037 0.001
Ethnicity: black* 0.509 0.587 0.078 0.000 0.415 0.529 0.114 0.000
Ethnicity: white* 0.247 0.152 0.094 0.000 0.354 0.223 0.131 0.000
Household size at ass. 4.503 4.825 0.323 0.000 4.351 4.492 0.141 0.011
Low household income in yr before
ass.**
0.313 0.382 0.069 0.000 0.227 0.288 0.062 0.000
High household income in yr before
ass.**
0.329 0.393 0.063 0.000 0.366 0.405 0.040 0.003
No. of times in welfare before ass. 2.079 2.326 0.247 0.000 1.915 2.134 0.218 0.000
Food stamps in yr before ass. 0.506 0.593 0.086 0.000 0.337 0.423 0.086 0.000
Public assistance in yr before ass. 0.251 0.283 0.032 0.020 0.240 0.262 0.022 0.067
In public housing 1 yr after ass. 0.164 0.231 0.067 0.000 0.118 0.171 0.053 0.000
Transfer payments in 1st yr after ass. 0.507 0.621 0.114 0.000 0.276 0.376 0.099 0.000
Ever arrested before ass. 0.160 0.172 0.013 0.276 0.317 0.329 0.012 0.357
No. of arrests in 1st yr after ass. 0.071 0.056 0.015 0.123 0.242 0.340 0.098 0.000
Pre-mediator labor market state
Ever worked before ass. 0.132 0.183 0.051 0.000 0.123 0.155 0.032 0.001
Worked in yr before ass. 0.707 0.480 0.227 0.000 0.728 0.526 0.202 0.000
Worked in 1st yr after ass. 0.812 0.389 0.423 0.000 0.828 0.424 0.404 0.000
Worked some time in months 9–12
after ass.
0.720 0.200 0.520 0.000 0.743 0.225 0.518 0.000
Worked all the time in months 9–12 0.384 0.009 0.375 0.000 0.394 0.014 0.381 0.000
In training in yr. before ass. 0.017 0.017 0.000 0.903 0.019 0.019 0.000 0.911
Vocational training in months 9–12 0.208 0.257 0.048 0.000 0.186 0.231 0.045 0.000
Academic training in months 9–12 0.323 0.411 0.089 0.000 0.317 0.430 0.112 0.000
Pre-mediator health (behavior)
Health at ass. (1 = very good, 4 = bad) 1.721 1.762 0.041 0.074 1.619 1.648 0.029 0.143
Health after 1 year (1 = very good,
4 = bad)
1.847 1.868 0.020 0.387 1.721 1.747 0.026 0.213
Phys./emot. problems at ass. 0.055 0.056 0.001 0.852 0.045 0.049 0.004 0.468
Phys./emot. problems 1 yr after ass. 0.157 0.140 0.017 0.115 0.126 0.114 0.012 0.200
Alcohol abuse before ass. 0.555 0.460 0.094 0.000 0.654 0.553 0.101 0.000
Alcohol abuse 1 yr after ass. 0.239 0.159 0.080 0.000 0.366 0.245 0.121 0.000
Illegal drugs before ass. 0.004 0.004 0.000 0.998 0.005 0.006 0.001 0.664
Illegal drugs 1 yr after ass. 0.010 0.008 0.002 0.413 0.020 0.013 0.007 0.053
Very good health after 2.5 yrs (Y) 0.333 0.333 0.000 0.999 0.428 0.413 0.015 0.287
Note:
*Baseline category is neither black nor white;
**baseline category is intermediate household income.
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estimators target the same parameter (the total of indirect effects). This again demonstrates the impor-
tance of carefully considering the choice of identifying assumptions.
To check the sensitivity of our results to potential attrition bias due to restricting our sample to in-
dividuals with observed post-treatment variables, we consider the response behavior in the follow-up
period to be a function of the observed variables D,W,X. This corresponds to the missing at random
assumption of Rubin (1976).20 The latter allows correcting for attrition bias by weighting observations
in the estimation by R/Pr(R= 1|D,W,X), with R being the binary response indicator (see, for instance,
Wooldridge, 2002, 2007). We estimate the response propensity Pr(R= 1|D,W,X) using a probit model
and ﬁnd that controlling for attrition substantially decreases the precision of the estimates, but does not
overthrow our results. We therefore conclude that for our sample of disadvantaged youths in the USA
the health effects mediated by employment appear to be negligible. In contrast, our estimates point to a
considerable direct effect of the program on the subjective health state of females.
6. CONCLUSION
This paper has demonstrated how to identify average direct and indirect effects of a binary treatment
under selection on observables, (mainly) based on inverse probability weighting (IPW) using the
treatment propensity score. Identiﬁcation relies on the assumption of conditional exogeneity of the
treatment as well as the mediator (the intermediate outcome of interest through which the indirect effect
operates) given observed variables. We have considered two sets of assumptions: mediator exogeneity
(i) given the treatment and covariates which are not inﬂuenced by the treatment (with the leading case
being pre-treatment variables) and (ii) given the treatment and covariates which are themselves a
function of the treatment. It has been shown that direct effects can be straightforwardly identiﬁed in
either case, whereas the identiﬁcation of indirect effects becomes more cumbersome in the latter case,
which, however, appears more realistic in empirical applications. The identiﬁcation issues for either set
of assumptions have been demonstrated in a simulation study. Finally, we have provided an application
to the experimental evaluation study of the Job Corps program. As the results are partly sensitive to
the choice of assumptions, the importance of carefully considering the plausibility of the imposed
identifying restrictions in the analysis of causal mechanisms cannot be overemphasized.
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Table VI. Effects on the incidence of very good general health after 2.5 years
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